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Hampden-Sydney College and the International Berkeley Society
Senior Editor’s Note

Bertil Belfrage

It is in deep sorrow that I have to announce the death of two friends and great Berkeley scholars, Ian Tipton and Colin Murray Turbayne. Among the positive news, I am pleased to inform you that the first president of the International Berkeley Society (IBS), Ray Houghton, has been awarded honorary doctor of the humanities and that Stephen Daniel has succeeded Tipton as president of IBS.

The second chapter in the history of the Berkeley Newsletter started in 2005 with issue number 16; it ends with number 17, the present issue. The new phase is a consequence of our decision to make it a full-scale internet journal by accepting not only short notes but also full-length articles. As I have decided to retire next year from being senior editor of the Newsletter, this new phase will be led by Stephen Daniel who kindly accepted to take over the lead of the journal. At the same time as I bid him welcome on board, I want to express my gratitude to my fellow editors for a most pleasant collaboration on reviving the Newsletter. I wish you all the best for the future.

Bodafors, Sweden

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Incoming Editor’s Note

Stephen H. Daniel

Three years ago Bertil Belfrage pointed out to me that in 2009 and 2010 Berkeley research will take on special significance as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the publication of some of Berkeley’s most influential works. In anticipation of those events, Bertil thought that getting the Berkeley Newsletter back in business would provide scholars with a means to exchange insights that otherwise might not appear in regular publications. Indeed, from 1977 to 1998 the Newsletter had been a source of just the kind of tidbits that often point to new avenues of enquiry. But more importantly, it was a place where researchers could share discoveries about Berkeley’s life, test ideas about historiography, or pursue provocative interpretations.

Last year, thanks to the support of Marc Hight (and Hampden-Sydney College), Silvia Parigi, Laurent Jaffro, and Tom Stoneham, Bertil’s vision for restarting the Newsletter was realized. The aims of the 2005 issue (#16) were modest: update the Berkeley bibliography, provide a forum for book reviews and abstracts, and open up a space for short research notes. With its inclusion of a longer article, the current issue (#17) adds another feature to the Newsletter’s repertoire, one that will expand in future issues.

Work on the Newsletter during these past two years has been transitional, aimed at linking its earlier life in print to its next phase as an internet journal. Toward that end, one of the great benefits of the new on-line format lies in its providing access to all of the earlier issues. Because of this, we are able to listen in on the discussions of a previous generation of scholars even as we explore new ways to appreciate Berkeley’s life and thought. Again, the credit for maintaining that continuity goes to Bertil Belfrage. Having returned the Newsletter to a viable condition, Bertil can now focus on other tasks, including his multi-year project of a new critical edition of Berkeley’s works.

In future issues the Newsletter will include notes, articles, reviews, and bibliographic updates. It will also include occasional bits of news and announcements (e.g. about conferences); but because that function is also already covered in the Berkeley Briefs of the International Berkeley Society and on the IBS website, those items will be kept at a minimum. As many of you know, I have recently been elected president of the IBS, and I am currently editor of the Berkeley Briefs (which normally is distributed to IBS members twice a year). I am pleased to see how the Berkeley Newsletter (which is concerned with scholarly research) and the Berkeley Briefs (which is concerned with the community of Berkeley researchers) complement one another. I also maintain the IBS website, so I will make sure that news of interest to the Berkeley community is disseminated. Apart from conference announcements and the comings and goings of scholars, though, there is usually not much news to report; but there always is more scholarship. That is why editing the Berkeley Newsletter will be the most appealing of my three tasks.

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In Memoriam: Ian C. Tipton

Charles J. McCracken

Ian C. Tipton, one of the world’s great Berkeley scholars and longtime president of the International Berkeley Society, died unexpectedly at his home in Swansea, Wales, on 7 February 2006, at the age of 68. Of the many works about Berkeley that were published in the twentieth century, few rival in importance his Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism (Methuen, 1974). In that work he carefully examined the methods—philosophical, linguistic, and psychological—that Berkeley used in reaching his chief conclusions, and examined, analyzed, and criticized Berkeley’s central doctrines about perception, matter, minds, and God. The philosophical insight, combined with the mastery of Berkeley’s texts, that Ian brought to this work make it one of the masterpieces of Berkeley scholarship. It is not surprising therefore that, when the Garland Publishing Company brought out, late in the 1980’s, a 15-volume collection of major works on Berkeley, Ian’s book was one of only two full-length studies of Berkeley published after 1935 to be included.

Ian Tipton was born in Redhill, Surrey, England in 1937. He received an M.A. from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (where he studied with the noted Locke scholar R. I. Aaron), and an M. Litt. from Oxford. In a teaching career that spanned almost four decades, Ian taught at the University of Keele (1964-67), the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (1967-88), and, from 1988 until his retirement, the University of Wales, Swansea. In 1994 he became president of the International Berkeley Society, a position he held until shortly before his death. His other publications included Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 1977), Berkeley's Principles and Dialogues: Background Source Materials, with C. J. McCracken (Cambridge University Press, 2000), and numerous articles.

Ian was a great scholar, but more than that, he was a great human being—kind, generous, and witty. In conversation, he could talk penetratingly about philosophy, and then turn to a play or musical or film he had recently been to, making insightful observations about it (and he loved the cinema and the theatre, especially the musical theatre), or recount an anecdote about some place he and his wife, Diana, had traveled to—and he was an avid traveler, who was always thinking of the last trip he’d made or the next one he hoped to make. It was my privilege and good fortune to know him for over twenty years and I’ll always be able to picture the mischievous twinkle that would come into his eyes just before he'd tell a funny story, and then the solemn look that would come over his face when he turned to a serious or important topic.

Every Berkeley scholar knew Ian Tipton, at least from his books and articles, and many also knew him personally because of his role in the International Berkeley Society and his frequent participation in scholarly gatherings in Britain, Europe, and the United States. And because Ian and Di spent parts of many summers in residence at Whitehall
(the house that Berkeley built in Newport, Rhode Island), no Berkeley scholar was better known than he to the Colonial Dames of Rhode Island, who are the keepers of Whitehall. His passing will be mourned there and everywhere that serious students of Berkeley’s philosophy are to be found.

He leaves behind his wife, Diana, who was his beloved companion for more than forty years, his sons David and Huw and their families, including his three grandchildren, and his friends and admirers throughout the world.

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In Memoriam: Colin Murray Turbayne

Paul J. Olscamp

Colin Murray Turbayne died on May 16, 2006 in Queensland, Australia after a full and productive life of 90 years. He was cremated and his ashes scattered in the ocean by his sons, as was done in the same place with his wife Ailsa’s remains in 1992. They were married for fifty-one years. They were very much in love, and after her death in 1992 Murray mourned her until his own passing. The Turbaynes have two boys, Ron and John, and two grandchildren, who survive them. His father, David Livingstone Turbayne was a banker, and his mother, Alice Eva Rene Lahey was a descendant of one of Queensland’s pioneer families.

Turbayne’s early education was at the Church of England Grammar School in Brisbane, where he distinguished himself as a cricketer and was Head Prefect. He earned a B.A. at the University of Queensland and his M.A. from the same institution in 1946. During World War II he served as MacArthur’s chief of staff for Australian Intelligence in several Pacific theatres. He married Ailsa Krimmer in 1940, and they emigrated to the United States in 1947. In 1950, Turbayne received his doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania and became Assistant Professor at the University of Washington, and then at UC Berkeley. In 1957 he moved to the University of Rochester where he remained until his retirement as Professor Emeritus in 1981.

During his tenure at Rochester he was a Fulbright Fellow, a Guggenheim Fellow and an NEH Senior Fellow. He also was awarded various grants. He and Ailsa established the International Berkeley Prize, which is administered by the University of Rochester. I met Professor Turbayne and his lovely wife Ailsa when I became a doctoral student at the University of Rochester in 1960. He became my dissertation advisor, and I served as his graduate assistant. Years later as president of Bowling Green State University I had the pleasure of conferring an honorary doctoral degree of Humane Letters upon him.
Turbayne was a widely respected scholar. His *The Myth of Metaphor* (Yale UP, 1962) is a centrally important read for anyone wishing to understand the nature of philosophical and scientific explanation. Its major thesis is that the Newtonian interpretation of the universe as a machine rests upon a mistake, a “sort-crossing” in which a useful explanatory metaphor, the machine model, has been taken literally. Turbayne argues that although the machine model/metaphor is useful, it should not be taken as a true description. There are other models which are, for some purposes, even better. He describes the “language model” and shows how it can explain certain natural phenomena which cannot be explained by Newton’s mechanics, including the Barrovian case, the inverted retinal image, and the case of the horizontal moon. Turbayne’s many works about George Berkeley made him one of the leading interpreters of that great man’s theories, especially his theories of vision and relative motion. He produced six major editions of Berkeley’s works, and wrote many articles about him and his relationships to the thought of other great thinkers, such as Hume and Kant. His last major work *Metaphors for the Mind: The Creative Mind and Its Origins*, was published in 1990.

Murray was the best teacher I ever witnessed. He loved to perform and had a wonderful sense of humor. He frequently received standing ovations from the students in his classes, particularly when illustrating philosophical points by performing Shakespearian scenes to illustrate them. Those who knew him will recall with a smile his use of the “Is this a dagger that I see before me…” scene from *Macbeth*, performed with actual cloak and dagger, to illustrate a point about metaphors. In seminars and individual sessions he was the perfect Socratic interrogator, drawing the student irresistibly to the correct conclusions. He was a master of the *reductio*.

He and his family were utterly without pretense. They once visited me on a remote island I owned in Northern Ontario, and each morning, rain or shine, the entire family, nude, would plunge into the lake and like a line of ducks, paddle around the island. Murray did have a quirky side. He once went “walkabout” with the aborigines and from them picked up the habit of occasionally purging himself of harmful bodily fluids. He did this by going on one month diets in which he ate nothing but grapes. He swore that this sharpened the mind and invigorated the body. Murray loved tennis and played it very well. He enjoyed reviewing the matches of the Australian tennis greats like Laver and Rose.

I once told him that I had asked Roderick Chisholm if he thought there was one philosophical question more important than any other. He replied, “Why of course: whether God exists.” Murray agreed with him. If the mind does survive bodily death, as Murray’s beloved Bishop Berkeley believed, the thought that Murray might now know the answer pleases me greatly. The world is a poorer place without him.

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Berkeley’s Ideas of Reflection

Daniel E. Flage

Does Berkeley countenance what Locke called ideas of reflection?\(^1\) A common answer is that he does not, indeed that he cannot,\(^2\) given that ideas cannot represent minds or operations of mind.\(^3\) Even the seeming reference to ideas of reflection in the opening sentence of *Principles*, Part I has been viewed as an accidental reference that does not represent Berkeley’s considered position.\(^4\)

In this paper I show that a significant body of textual evidence suggests Berkeley was committed to the existence of ideas of reflection. I argue that Luce’s claim, “One of his [Berkeley’s] cardinal contentions, urged over and over again, is that there are no ideas of the mind and its operations.”\(^5\) is either trivially true or false, neither of which precludes a commitment to ideas of reflection. Finally, I argue that insofar as ideas are effects of

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\(^3\) See Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 25, 27, 89, 135, 139, 142, in *Works*: 2:51-52, 52-53, 79-80, 103, 104-105, and 106; and George Berkeley, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, in *Works*: 2:231-234; *Philosophical Commentaries* 684, in *Works*, 1:83. Further references to the *Principles*, Part I (PHK) will be made parenthetically by section, as will references to the Introduction to the *Principles* (Intro.), the *New Theory of Vision* (NTV) and the *Theory of Vision Vindicated* (TVV). Parenthetical references to the *Three Dialogues* (DPH) will be to page numbers in volume 2 of the *Works*; and references to the *Philosophical Commentaries* (PC) will be by entry number.


\(^5\) Luce, *Berkeley’s Immaterialism*, 40.
immaterial substances, there would be a strict parity between ideas of sense and ideas of reflection. Taken together, these provide good reason to believe that the common claim that Berkeley rejected ideas of reflection (the negative thesis) is false.

The opening sentence of *Principles*, Part I, reads:

> It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.

To anyone who approaches Berkeley from a Lockean context, it is natural to read “such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind” as an allusion to ideas of reflection. If this were the only place Berkeley seems to allude to ideas of reflection, it might be plausible to suggest it was an accidental or ambiguous allusion. But there are other places where he explicitly refers to ideas of reflection. In *Principles* 25, where he is discussing the passivity of ideas, Berkeley writes, “But whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is therefore no such thing contained in them.” In PHK 35 he alludes to *apprehension* “by sense or reflexion.” In PHK 68, where Berkeley is arguing that the notion of material substance proposed by the occasionalist is unintelligible, he says, “Now I would fain know how any thing can be present to us, which is neither perceivable [my emphasis] by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place.” Similarly, there seems to be an allusion to ideas of reflection in PHK 74: “For what is there on our part, or what do we perceive amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions, which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion?” In PHK 89, where Berkeley is discussing the idea of his own mind, he writes, “We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason” (cf. DHP 233, NTV 23). The allusions to “apprehension” and “perception” suggest that what is perceived is an idea, which could only be an idea of reflection. The allusion to an “inward feeling or reflexion” suggests one is concerned with what Locke called ideas of reflection, since it is on the basis of such ideas that Locke claimed the mind and its states are known.

Do these allusions to ideas of reflection show that Berkeley countenanced a distinction between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection? No. It is possible that Berkeley, who is generally known for his care in expression, inadvertently or intentionally suggested a

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6 Berkeley does not use “reflection” and “reflexion” univocally. Sometimes it refers to a property of light (cf. NTV 30). Sometimes it is synonymous with “thinking about” or “reasoning about” (cf. PC 656, 670, 724; NTV 20 51, 80, 131, 135; TVV 56, 63; Intro. 18; PHK 22, 50, 51, 149; most uses of “reflexion” in the *Dialogues* are in this sense; see, for example, DHP 197, 205, 212, 231, 248, 261). Sometimes, when he explicitly alludes to “ideas of reflection,” he seems merely to be matching his verbiage to the Locke model he is discussing (cf. PC 571, 585; PHK 13). These I discount.
distinction he did not accept. So the fact that Berkeley alludes to ideas of reflection at several points is, perhaps, only an anomaly for which the proponent of the negative thesis must provide a plausible account.

Proponents of the negative thesis correctly acknowledge that Berkeley regularly claims that we have no ideas of minds and their operations. Luce put it this way: “One of his cardinal contentions, urged over and over again, is that there are no ideas of the mind and its operations.” But what does this mean? What is the sense of “of”? Is it the “of” of identity, the “of” representation, or the “of” of signification?

If one is concerned with the “of” of identity, Luce was certainly correct. If one sees a red apple, the redness of the idea is identical with the redness of the apple insofar as the idea is a constitutive part of the apple (cf. PHK 1). In this sense, Berkeley clearly denies that one can have ideas of minds, insofar ideas are passive and minds are active (PHK 25 and 27). So, if there are ideas of reflection, they cannot be constitutive parts of minds; the “of” cannot be the “of” of identity.

If one is concerned with the “of” of representation, Luce’s claim is true but uninteresting. The likeness principle (PHK 8) maintains that an idea can be like nothing other than an idea. Since Berkeley construed ideational representation in terms of resemblance (cf. Intro. 11-12), the likeness principle is applicable across the board: Ideas of sensation can represent nothing other than ideas of sensation—indeed, ideas of the same kind of sensation—and if there were ideas of reflection, they could represent nothing other than resembling ideas of reflection. So, if Luce’s claim concerns the “of” of representation, it is true but uninteresting: It tells one nothing that is peculiar to ideas of reflection.

On the other hand, if Luce was concerned with the “of” of signification, there is reason to believe his claim is false. Only an idea of sight can resemble—and thereby represent—another idea of sight. But, as we learn from the New Theory of Vision, although ideas of sight and touch are distinct in kind, they can be associated in such a way that an idea of sight signifies an idea of touch. Indeed, there is little question that ideas of sensation, for example, can be taken to signify passions. For example, blushing can signify shame (NTV 65; cf. NTV 10, 23, Intro. 20). This suggests that the signification relation is quite broad. For example, effects of causal relations properly so called (as well as “occasional” relations, PHK 65) can signify their causes (cf. DHP 223, 231-232). So, if Berkeley countenanced ideas of reflection, they could signify, even if they could not represent, operations of mind.8

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7 Luce, Berkeley’s Immaterialism, 40.
8 Typically Berkeley construes signification as a relation among ideas. Ideas of sight and touch are experienced together. As a result of this temporal association, ideas of sight are taken to signify ideas of touch. The same holds regarding the ideas of words and the objects they signify. If there are ideas of reflection, the signification relation rests on a different ground, since there are no ideas that are identical with operations of the mind. Nonetheless, if there is a necessary (causal) connection between ideas of reflection and operations of the mind, that should be sufficient for a signification relation, since the relation is stronger than temporal association.
But the fact that the signification could provide an unproblematic relation between ideas of reflection and a mind does not, in itself, show that Berkeley countenanced ideas of reflection. If we must discount the textual allusions to ideas of reflection in the *Principles*, is there any remaining evidence that Berkeley granted that there are ideas of reflection?

Yes. In PHK 27 (all editions) Berkeley writes, “Such is the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of it self perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth.” The general topic of PHK 27 is knowledge of mind. The sentence appears after Berkeley explicitly claims that one cannot have an *idea* of mind, and before he claims one cannot have so much as a relative *idea* of mind.9

If Berkeleian ideas of reflection are the *effects* of operations of the mind, they parallel Lockean ideas of reflection. As Locke wrote:

> In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind, and its own operations, *proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself*; which when reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge.10

What does that mean? If there is a Lockean parallel, then a particular kind of mental state or operation produces a particular kind of idea of reflection: Distinct operations of mind produce what Hume later called different “feelings or sentiments.”11 For example, being angry feels different from being in love. If there are ideas of reflection, they are distinct from, but parallel to, ideas of sensation: Ideas of sensation are effects of a mind or minds other than one’s own; ideas of reflection are only effects of one’s own mind.

Indeed, the Berkeley of the *Theory of Vision . . . Vindicated* suggests that it is: “In certain cases a sign may suggest its correlate as an image, in others as an effect, in others as a cause” (TVV 39; cf. DHP 223).

9 Cf. PC 712, TVV 18, PHK 145, 147, DHP 240. In the second edition of the *Principles*, this is followed by the remark that we have notions of mind. I have argued elsewhere that such notions might well be relative. See Daniel E. Flage, *Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions: A Reconstruction based on his Theory of Meaning* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

10 *Essay* II.i.24, p. 141, emphasis added. He later identifies some of the modes of ideas of reflection as “Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith” (*Essay* II.vi.1, p. 159).


12 Whether Berkeley held that finite minds can produce ideas in other finite minds is an issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.
If Berkeley’s position is that minds are known only by their effects, then ideas of reflection are immediately known, and minds—whether one’s own or the minds of others—are only mediately known. One’s notion of a mind or activity of a mind is that which causes $x$, where $x$ is an idea or series of ideas. It is this type of consideration that Berkeley cites as the basis for introducing the notion of immaterial substance in Principles 26. There he is concerned with the cause of the succession and order of ideas of sensation. If one’s own mind is also known only by its effects, then one’s notion of a certain state of one’s own mind is “the cause of $x$,” where $x$ is an idea of reflection.\(^{13}\)

But it is one thing to say there is room in Berkeley’s system for ideas of reflection insofar as they are caused by and signify operations of the mind. It is something else to claim that Berkeley was committed to the existence of ideas of reflection. Here are three points that favor attributing ideas of reflection to Berkeley. (1) If there were ideas of reflection, it would yield a parallelism between knowledge of external causes and knowledge of internal states as causes. As in Locke’s philosophy, ideas of sensation would causally correlate to states of external substances, while ideas of reflection would causally correlate to internal states; unlike Locke, both causes would be immaterial.\(^{14}\) (2) It would explain why Berkeley was frequently willing to use the expression “ideas of reflexion.” even why in the New Theory of Vision he went so far as to claim, “And yet no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in the face of another, but it brings into his mind the idea of that passion which hath been observed to accompany it” (NTV 23, emphasis added).\(^{15}\) And, (3) it would yield a strictly ideational reading of the opening sentence of

\(^{13}\) I have long been puzzled by Berkeley’s remark at PHK 30 that “The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination” and comparable allusions to degrees of force and vivacity in Hume. How can ideas, which are inherently inactive (PHK 25), be strong or lively? As far as I know, Berkeley never answers that question. Nonetheless, if Berkeley countenanced ideas of reflection, I believe there is a plausible answer to that question. The clue comes from Hume.

As I have shown elsewhere [Daniel E. Flage, *David Hume’s Theory of Mind* (London: Routledge, 1990), 68-86], Hume’s descriptions of his favorite mental state, belief, change between the Treatise and the first Enquiry. While in the Treatise he generally takes force and vivacity to be a characteristic of a perception, in the Enquiry he suggests that it is a feeling that accompanies or is annexed to an idea of sensation or reflection. It is the idea of reflection marking belief—or, perhaps, a number of resembling impressions of reflection, which correspond to degrees of belief—that constitute the “force and vivacity” of the idea.

If Berkeley countenanced ideas of reflection—distinct ideas that correspond to distinct operations of mind—this could provide the basis for giving an account of the liveliness and strength of an idea. Notice that such ideas would be distinct from ideas of sensation that might also accompany ideas of sensation, e.g. kinesthetic sensations when the eye focuses or the pressure in one’s finger that occurs when one picks up a book.

\(^{14}\) This might explain the entry in Berkeley’s notebooks: “Mem: To begin the 1st Book not with mention of Sensation & Reflection but instead of those to use perception or thought in general” (PC 571).

\(^{15}\) Notice, this passage suggests an idea of sense signifies an idea of the passion. If there are ideas of reflection, “the idea of that passion” would be understood as the idea arising as an effect of a certain passionate state of mind. If there are not ideas of reflection, it is difficult to understand what could be meant by the passage.
the *Principles*, Part I. While none of these singly might be a sufficient reason to attribute ideas of reflection to Berkeley, they conjointly provide at least good circumstantial evidence that he was committed to the existence of ideas of reflection.

Some are still likely to raise objections. One such might go as follows:

Virtually everything you have said was based on the *New Theory of Vision* and the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Comparable references to “ideas of reflection” are conspicuously missing in the *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. Indeed, there Philonous is made to say, “I … know, that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly, as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms *I* and *myself*; and I know this immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound” (DHP 231). This passage suggests that ideas of reflection are *not needed* to know oneself and one’s states. Hence, there is still good reason to doubt that Berkeley was committed to ideas of reflection.

There are two distinct issues here. The first concerns the *Dialogues* in general. The second concerns a specific passage from the *Dialogues*.

If Berkeley was committed to the existence of ideas of reflection, why were they not mentioned in the *Dialogues*? One answer is that it might well have been beyond the scope of his interests to do so. If the *Dialogues* are nothing more than a popular reworking of the *Principles*, then one might expect the same distinctions would be found in the *Dialogues* that were found in the *Principles*.¹⁶ But there is some reason to believe that Berkeley’s focus was narrower in the *Dialogues* than in the *Principles*. In the “Preface” he indicated that the topics covered “are farther pursued, or placed in different lights, and other points handled, which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them” (DHP 169) in the *Principles* and the *New Theory of Vision*. Further, his explicit objective was, in Philonous’ words, to “examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest sceptic” (DHP 173). That topic does not require a discussion of ideas of reflection.¹⁷

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¹⁶ Given other popular rewritings, however, such an expectation might be unwarranted. For example, although the distinction between perceptions of sensation and perceptions of reflection was prominent in Hume’s *Treatise*, the distinction is all but ignored in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. See David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), i.iii.5, p. 64; David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), VII.1.9, p. 137. Hume’s other allusions to “reflection” concern thinking about.

As to the passage quoted, there is nothing that precludes a commitment to ideas of reflection. If there is a necessary (causal) connection between ideas of reflection and states or operations of the self, then the existence of the idea as known entails the existence of a state of the knower.\textsuperscript{18} The second sentence is ambiguous. If it assumes a description of the properties and actions of the mind, these could be known by their effects, that is, ideas of reflection, which are perceived but not “as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound.”\textsuperscript{19} If it is concerned with the nature of mind as substance, it would still need to be substance under a certain description, e.g. that which knows, and its existence follows directly from the existence of something known.\textsuperscript{20}

So, we have seen that while Luce and others are correct in claiming that there cannot be Berkeleian ideas of reflection that are identical with operations of an immaterial substance or represent immaterial substance and its operations, it is entirely consistent with the Berkeleian texts to suggest that there are ideas of reflection that are caused by and signify operations of the mind.

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\textsuperscript{18} Cf. PHK 2, where Berkeley introduces a knower given the existence of ideas as objects of human knowledge. One might also notice that it is only in the second edition of the *Principles* that Berkeley adds a passage to PHK 89 that includes minds as objects of knowledge.

\textsuperscript{19} This would yield a description comparable to, although more complex than, Descartes’ description of himself in Meditation II: “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.” René Descartes, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 19.

\textsuperscript{20} Any attempt to give a description of Berkeley’s theory of the nature of substance is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that it is not a classical theory of substance and modes, since Berkeley denied that ideas are modes of a mind (see PHK 49; DHP 237).
George Berkeley and Thomas Secker: A Note

Tom Jones

Thomas Secker, successively bishop of Bristol (1735), Oxford (1737), Dean of St. Paul’s (1750), and Archbishop of Canterbury (1758), is mentioned by Alexander Campbell Fraser, A. A. Luce, and David Berman as one of Berkeley’s close associates, often with the citation from Pope’s Epilogue to the Satires, “Dialogue II.” lines 70-73, where Secker is decent and Berkeley has every virtue under heaven. Fraser reproduces many of the letters from Secker to Berkeley that are preserved in the Berkeley papers in the British Library. There is a general recognition that Secker, who later patronized Berkeley’s son George, is a long-standing and important connection for Berkeley. Yet there has been no attempt, as far as I can tell, to explore Secker’s career and relate it to Berkeley’s, and that is what I shall attempt briefly here. I want to suggest that after moving to Cloyne, Berkeley did not become a recluse or interest himself only in Irish national issues (as some accounts suggest), but was participating in a broader effort of the Anglican episcopate to promote the place of the church in national and civic life by means of challenging secular political authority and promoting residence and activity from local clergy. This effort appealed to Berkeley’s already developed opposition to free-thinking and irreligion. I will revisit the Berkeley-Secker correspondence and look at Secker’s ambitions for the church in order to explore this effort. I will also suggest that some passages from The Querist encourage one to see Berkeley’s life at Cloyne in this way, and that the clerical and socio-economic aspects of Berkeley’s time at Cloyne are closely related.

In August 1766 Secker began writing an autobiography in response to comments made about him by Francis Blackburne in publications relating to the controversy over the institution of Anglican bishops in America, a scheme Secker vigorously supported. In this apology Secker mentions his friendship with Berkeley, reporting their first acquaintance and his later patronage of George Berkeley Junior: “Somewhat before I went into Orders, I became acquainted with Dr Clarke of St James’s, & with Dean Berkeley, afterwards Bishop of Cloyne” (9). “My good Friend Bishop Berkeley dying at Oxford in January, his Widow & Son & Daughter spent the Summer with me, [and I gave his Son, after I was made ABp, the Chancellorship of Brecknock, the Vicarage of Bray, & the Rectory of Acton, 3 of my options]” (33). The Autobiography provides evidence

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3 The matter in square brackets indicates footnote additions Secker made to his text.
of the friendship between Berkeley and Secker. It is a principal source for the biographical review introducing the posthumous edition of Secker’s works, which elaborates and expands upon it: “He now [1721/2] spent a considerable Part of his Time in London, where he quickly gained the Esteem of some of the most learned and ingenious Men of those Days, particularly of Dr. CLARKE, Rector of St. James’s, and the celebrated Dean BERKELEY, afterwards Bishop of Cloyne, with whom he every Day became more delighted and more closely connected.”

The Autobiography also provides a scrap of hitherto unrecognized information concerning Berkeley’s whereabouts between winter 1727 and spring 1728. Fraser notes that there is nothing indicating Berkeley’s location at this time.5 Luce approaches the period with wariness, recognizing that Berkeley is making many complex and some secretive arrangements: “An air of mystery surrounds his movements in 1727 and 1728 (early), probably connected either with the Bermuda business or with his approaching marriage or with both.” Luce suggests a trip to Dublin and notes that Berkeley is back in London in February 1728.6

Secker’s Autobiography provides an answer to the mystery of Berkeley’s location. Secker travelled from London to Bath in the <End of August,> where I {was in the beginning of September, &} stayed there till {Spring} <Apr.8.1728>. There I became acquainted with Mr Ralph Allen, afterwards so noted; & with Dean Stanhope, by whose Bedside I stood at his Death, in March 1727..8 [& with Mr, afterwards Sir John, James; & with Mr Dalton; who, with Dean Berkeley, were here a considerable Part of the Winter.] (11-12)

I have uncovered no evidence of what Berkeley was doing in Bath at this time, but perhaps, given that Dalton and James both accompanied him to America, he was involved in Bermuda business. Perhaps Berkeley is in Bath partly to discuss Bermuda and other religious matters with Secker?7

Pursuing the connection between Secker and Berkeley allows for a change of emphasis in the description of Berkeley’s tenure of his bishopric. Fraser (233-34) and Luce (173) respectively describe this period as one of reclusion and active retirement. Luce notes that Berkeley “exchanged episcopal confidences with English bishops, with Gibson of London, Secker of Oxford, and Benson of Gloucester.” that he was concerned with the economic condition of Ireland, and that he hardly left Cloyne in eighteen years. Luce acknowledges that Berkeley “had been an absentee dean [having spent much of his time

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7 I owe this suggestion to M. A. Stewart.
as Dean of Derry in London and America], but he atoned as a bishop, for he hardly ever left his diocese” (173). Luce is keen to point out, however, that, at least in relation to Berkeley’s social life, “Fraser’s picture of Berkeley as ‘the recluse of Cloyne’ may be dismissed as a caricature” (186). I would like to suggest that Berkeley’s dedicated residence at Cloyne, his correspondence with English bishops, and his social and economic thought in this early episcopal period are connected. I will do this by looking at one letter from Secker to Berkeley that Fraser for some reason does not print in the run of letters between Berkeley and these English bishops (235-60), and suggesting that Berkeley and Secker share a sense of the importance of resident clergy for achieving the moral resuscitation of communities.8

On 29 June 1737 Secker wrote from Gloucester to Berkeley in Cloyne, thanking him for a congratulatory letter on his appointment as bishop of Oxford. He says he is able to avoid thinking about church-state relations, but digresses on precisely those worries:9

My very good Lord

I return you my hearty thanks for your friendly letter of Congratulation. I have made an exchange, to accommodate other persons, which I never thought an advantageous one to my self in point of interest and begin to fear too late it will prove the contrary. But I have some advantage in situation by removing from your neighbour-city of Bristol: and a good situation I think is well worth purchasing. But then one should stay in it and I assure you my Lord I have no views of removing. To tread in the steps of my predecessor is to be Bishop of Oxford two and twenty years. What fancies one may come to have by the end of that time I cannot foretell but when the Bishop of Glocester and I were at the late Archbishops funeral we were clearly of opinion that breathing the air of Lambeth and being buried in the Church of Croyden are neither of them felicities that one would much disquiet ones self to attain. And now I have mentioned my Lord of Glocester I should tell you in the next place that I and my family are at present his guests. My poor wife was most deplorably ill all the last year at Bath and had too frequent occasion to practice your Lordships rule of early rising, the disorder of her Spirits not permitting her either to sleep or lie in bed awake. She is now recovered enough to take small journeys and I have bought her from Bath hither in hopes she may receive great benefit from the neighbourhood of her native air and the chearfull Hospitality of our good brother. We have been here as yet somewhat less than a week but so far the experiment succeeds very well: and we enjoy bright days and cool evenings in a very entertaining tranquillity, quite

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8 Fraser had, of course, studied the Berkeley papers and prints most of the letters to and from Berkeley. He had also seen the Secker MSS. The details I present here are merely things he does not mention or seems to have overlooked.

9 British Library MS Add 39311, fols. 37-38. I am grateful to the British Library for allowing me to reproduce this letter. The letter from Secker to Berkeley in response to Berkeley’s congratulations on Secker becoming bishop of Bristol makes the point that Bristol and Cloyne are “neighbour cities.” and so links these two letters clearly. See Fraser, Life and Letters, 235-36, and B. L. MS Add 39311, fols. 27-28. I reproduce the final stratum of the letter as neither of the two small corrections Secker made merit recording.
unconcerned about what may befall either Church or State the next Session. The ministry I believe mean us of the Clergy neither any harm nor much good. Many of those who would be thought their best friends indeed are vehement against us and so are many also of their most determined enemies. It doth not seem therefore that our strength lies in adhering to either party; as indeed I think it never can: but in the honest policy of acting uprightly between both and joyning with neither to do wrong. They who act thus will either stand or fall with honour. I see very little prospect that any thing in the Established Church will be altered for the better: for Ministers are against all changes and they who complain would be very sorry to see the things which they complain of, mended. Nor doth there appear any immediate danger of alterations for the worse. And yet considering the increasing disregard to Religion and every thing that deserves the name of principle, together with the strange growth of that wild Spirit which calls it self zeal for Liberty there would be no reason to wonder at any shock how great or sudden soever which might happen either to the Ecclesiastical or the Civil part of our Constitution. But sufficient for the day is the Evil thereof. May the calm which you seem to have at present in Ireland continue and may we none of us ever needlessly bring storms upon our selves. The Clergy might do much towards laying those which are raised already if we had not our share of faults as well as our Adversaries. But enough of these matters. Miss Talbot whom you are so good to mention particularly is grown a very fine Girl and continues a very good one. Her Mama and she, the Prelate and his sister desire you and Mrs Berkeley to accept their compliments and best wishes to you both and your whole family: With which I beg leave to joyn those of

My Lord
Your sincerely affectionate brother
and faithfull servt
Tho. Oxford

This is an episcopal confidence, but what are the problems in church-state relations that Secker is talking about, and is there any particular reason for him mentioning them to Berkeley?

Secker was newly translated to Oxford when he wrote this letter. He was to stay there for 22 years (as punishment, he suspected, for knowing Frederick Prince of Wales and occasionally voting against the government) before becoming Archbishop of Canterbury. He writes from Benson’s seat in Gloucester. He was friendly with Gibson of London. He is at the center of church life, but is to some degree controlled by court patronage. Gibson had become ecclesiastical counsellor to the government in 1723 and is known to have entertained a strong desire to reform certain aspects of church administration and increase the standing of the church in relation to government and to the daily life of the population. He proposed revising the distribution of parishes amongst the bishoprics in order to make residence and the execution of full parochial duties possible. Secker recorded Gibson’s proposals in his MSS, and Secker’s time as archbishop of Canterbury has been interpreted by church historian Norman Sykes as carrying on Gibson’s project through “oversight, by visitation, confirmation, ordination and pastoral counsel to the
clergy in the discharge of their parochial ministry.” Sykes summarizes the relationship between Gibson and Secker in the following terms: “With the failure of Gibson’s thorough-going project, Secker strove to maintain the position of the established church by diligence and devotion to episcopal duties along conventional lines, accepting the suspension of Convocation and the impossibility of carrying through a programme of change.” Secker sees Gibson attempting to increase the stature of the church through collaboration with the government, with the hope of stamping out the irreligion of the population and the government itself. He sees Gibson split from Walpole in the winter of 1735 over the rejection of the Quaker Bill: “On this occasion Bp Gibson broke with Sr Robt Walpole: & Bp Potter came into Favour.” In the next session Potter becomes Archbishop of Canterbury and Secker is sent to Oxford. At this point he writes the letter to Berkeley I have presented. He pursues his course of strict diocesan discipline in order to place the church as prominently in the daily and moral life of the nation as possible, having seen the failure of political collaboration in achieving the same ends. Berkeley felt extreme disappointment with the government earlier than Secker, realizing by March 1730/31 that he would never receive the funds for his Bermuda project promised by the King. He felt “absolutely abandoned” by his supporters, and considered the abandonment of his project part of a larger social and moral problem: “What they foolishly call free thinking seems to me the principal root or source not only of opposition to our College but of most other evils in this age.” Berkeley would have been very familiar with the disillusion expressed by Secker.

This letter from Secker to Berkeley, as so many of the letters between the bishops, is not just an exchanged confidence. It is part of a concerted effort to confound the rise of dangerous libertinism, irreligion and free-thinking by insisting on disciplined ecclesiastical conduct, full residency, and impassioned argument for the rational necessity of the Christian revelation. Berkeley’s interest in residence and clerical activity on his arrival at Cloyne, for him a new response to the problem of irreligion that had been motivating him at least since his Guardian essays in 1713, can be related to Secker’s response to his appointment in Oxford. Luce reproduces a passage from Joseph Stock’s 1776 Life of Berkeley, noting that Berkeley “applied himself with vigour to the faithful discharge of all episcopal duties. He revived in his diocese the useful office of rural dean which had gone into disuse, visited frequently parochially, and confirmed in the several

11 Sykes, From Sheldon to Secker, x.
15 See Works 7: 179-228.
parts of his see.”¹⁶ Luce also notes that Berkeley corresponded with Benson on the question of reviving rural deaneries (175). There is, unsurprisingly, a degree of collaboration and consultation amongst the bishops concerning clerical activity that amounts to more than an exchange of confidences.

The Querist’s ironic presentation of absenteeism in contrast to clerical residence provides some evidence of the social and moral aims of Berkeley’s attempt to increase the presence of the clergy in Cloyne. Berkeley’s criticism of absenteeism is relatively mild and oblique, perhaps in part because he was himself an absentee for so long, appointed Dean of Derry in 1724, and never taking up residence there. Nonetheless, absentees are presented as drawing coin out of Ireland (Q.32), and a decrease in their numbers is to be sought through the improvement of the real estate of Ireland (Q.408).¹⁷ The Querist also asks if those who spend their money on foreign imports “are not so far forth to be reckoned absentees?” (Querist 134, Q.104). The economic problem of absenteeism is contrasted to the civic influence of clerical residence, in the context of complaints about the privileges of the clergy: “What is there in the clergy to create a jealousy in the public? Or what would the public lose by it, if every squire in the land wore a black coat, said his prayers, and was obliged to reside?” (Querist 154, Q.342). The presence of these queries amidst considerations concerning the nature and purpose of monetary tokens, the benefits of a national bank, and the necessity of balancing import and export suggests that Berkeley conceived of his residence at Cloyne as part of a broader social project that incorporated the provisions for local industry he and his wife established there, such as the spinning school and workhouse.¹⁸ Berkeley’s project, I suggest, is related to Secker’s desire to re-establish the church in the moral and civic life of the population through clerical presence rather than through central government, and the bishops encourage one another in this project through their correspondence. Berkeley’s residence at Cloyne is not just a period of concentration on Irish issues enlivened on a personal level by correspondence with English bishops. Berkeley’s correspondence with Secker nourishes and supports Berkeley’s activities. Berkeley’s activities of this period coincide with the interests and concerns of Secker in a much closer way than I think has been recognized. Reconsidering Berkeley’s correspondence and broader relationship with his episcopal colleague Secker adds to an understanding of his residence at Cloyne and the activities he engaged in there.

¹⁶ Luce, Life of Berkeley, 173.
¹⁸ See Luce, Life, 180, 189.
Berkeley on Necessary Prejudices: A Note

Wolfgang Breidert

In the *Theory of Vision* (TVV 29, 36, 43), the *Principles* (PHK 73-75), and the *Dialogues* (Works 2: 238), Berkeley speaks about a special group of prejudices, namely, the inevitable prejudices connected with visual perception. Berkeley also concedes necessary prejudices in the foundation of elementary arithmetic, and he pleads for an instrumentalist approach to it (PC 758-768, PHK 118-122), but he denounces them in higher mathematics: theory of fluxions or theory of infinitesimals [A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics (1735), 21]. In *Alciphron* II.10-11 the discussion between the “minute philosopher” Lysicles and Berkeley’s champions, Euphranor and Crito, is concerned with one of the most important aims of the age of Enlightenment, i.e., the demolition of prejudices. Lysicles claims to belong to “the only unprejudiced part of mankind . . . whose constant aim it is to detect and demolish prejudices of all kinds.” Lysicles, speaking as though he had read Nietzsche’s theory of seduction, is convinced that “virtue . . . is a trick of statesmen.” But Euphranor turns the tables by taking into consideration whether an atheistic education could not serve as a prejudice toward atheism. Finally Crito draws the conclusion that the minute philosophers, i.e., the atheists, “have some small prejudice, though not in favour of virtue.”

In the *Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority* (1738), Berkeley gives a definition of prejudice: “Prejudices are notions or opinions which the mind entertains without knowing the grounds and reasons of them, and which are assented to without examination.” In the *Discourse* he is concerned with social education. For the aims of moral education some notions should be “early imbibed, before their grounds and reasons are apprehended or understood.” Berkeley is convinced “that a system of salutary notions is absolutely necessary to the support of every civil constitution.” These early imbibed salutary notions take the place of provisional morals, which are needed for the constitution of law and order as well as in the life of the individual human being in a state. “The first notions which take possession of the minds of men, with regard to duties social, moral, and civil, may therefore be justly styled prejudices.” In this case Berkeley did not use the term “prejudice” with disdain. Quite on the contrary he emphasized that there are and will be inevitable prejudices: “Do what you can, there will still be a bias from education . . . These notions first instilled have the earliest influence, take the deepest root, and generally are found to give a colour and complexion to the subsequent lives of men, inasmuch as they are in truth the great source of human actions.” To Berkeley it seemed even to be dangerous to abolish all of the prejudices: “But if you strip men of these their notions, or, if you will, prejudices, with regard to modesty, decency, justice, charity, and the like, you will soon find them so many monsters, utterly unfit for human society.” Prejudices about morals, justice, etc. are essential foundations of a society (Works 6: 203-204).

Berkeley stresses that a prejudice may be true, because we have to distinguish between false opinions (i.e., errors) and opinions accepted without reasoning (i.e., prejudices),
which may be true. Even the Euclidean axioms are “early imbibed” and “with most men
an object of belief rather than knowledge.”

“Certainly, if a notion may be concluded
false because [!] it was early imbibed, or because [!] it is with most men an object of
belief rather than of knowledge, one may by the same reasoning conclude several
propositions of Euclid to be false.” And in fact, we need some axioms without any
reasoning for the establishment of state and for every social or scientific community
(Works 6: 205-206).

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19 In contrast to PC 163.
News and Announcements

International Berkeley Conference
at the University of Helsinki, Finland
6-9 August 2007

We are approaching the 300th anniversary of such historic contributions to philosophy as George Berkeley’s *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). Anticipating these major celebrations, distinguished scholars will give a diversified account of Berkeley’s works with respect to his broad range of interest. The conference, that will take place at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Helsinki, is organized by Timo Airaksinen, Bertil Belfrage and Ville Paukkonen. The conference is sponsored by the International Berkeley Society. For further information, please contact one of the organizers:

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International Conference on George Berkeley:
Religion and Science in the Age of Enlightenment
(Gaeta, 27-29 September 2007)

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1685-1753), was considered “the most engaging and useful man in Ireland in the eighteenth century.” This hyperbolic statement refers both to Berkeley’s life and thought; in fact, he always felt himself a pioneer called to think and do new things. He was the author of a new theory of vision, of the celebrated “new principle” of immaterialism, of a “new argument” to prove the existence of God, of a bold criticism of Newtonian infinitesimals, of a “new method of indivisibles,” of new proposals to improve Irish economy, of a novel panacea (i.e., tar-water). Moreover, he was a very active Christian, one of the most progressive landowners in Southern Ireland, a zealous bishop always residing in his diocese. He planned the foundation of St. Paul’s College, in the Bermudas, for the religious and philosophical education of the natives. Berkeley was an empiricist well versed in the sciences, an amateur of the mechanical arts, spending many hours in the foundries learning metallurgical techniques.

The University of Cassino organizes a three-day international conference on Berkeley’s contributions to various scientific disciplines, in the context of eighteenth-century science, philosophy and religion.

For further information, please contact Silvia Parigi, University of Cassino, silpari@libero.it
Recent Works on Berkeley
(1990 – 2006)


Ameriks, Karl. “Idealism from Kant to Berkeley.” In Gersh and Moran (2006), 244-68.


_____. “Apprendre à voir: les enseignements de la Défense de la Théorie de la vision.” In Berlioz (2003), 135-57.

_____. “Comment Berkeley parvient à maintenir que la neige est blanche.” In Charles (2004), 127-44.


Ayers, Michael and Garber, Daniel. “Theories of Knowledge and Belief.” In Garber (1998), 1003-1061.


_____. “Vers une nouvelle interprétation de la Théorie de la vision de Berkeley.” In Berlioz (2003), 159-211.


_____._ “We see God”: George Berkeley’s philosophical theology. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1997.


_____. “‘One is All, and All is One.’ The Great Chain of Being in Berkeley’s *Siris.*” In *Ordering the World in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by Frank O’Gorman and Diana Donald. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 63-82.


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_____.”Berkeley, Individuation and Physical Objects.” In Barber and Gracia (1994).


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Jolley, Nicholas. “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causation and Volition.” In Cover (1990), 227-44.


_____. “Demons that deceive, gods that perceive, and the limits of skepticism.” In Brykman (1997), 73-89.


_____ . “‘The horse is in the stable, the Books are in the study as before’: appunti per una storia della storiografia berkeleiana.” Bollettino filosofico dell’Università della Calabria 9 (1991): 113-34.


_____. “Suggestion, habitude et jugement: la part cachée de la Théorie de la vision de Berkeley.” In Berlioz (2003), 79-102.


