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Berkeley
Newsletter

No 11 (1989-90)
In the last century G.A. Aitken tracked down most of the works used to create the Ladies Library (LL). I should like here to build upon his work in three ways. First, by listing sources that he missed and indicating their place in the LL. Second, by supplementing his catalogue of the editor's insertions, that is, passages we can now very reasonably accept as Berkeley's. Third, by listing those passages of the LL that remain to be identified.

Since few readers have ready access to a particular edition of the works below, including the LL, I identify passages by paragraph rather than page number. I hope this method - though perhaps not perfectly accurate among certain editions of certain works - will be of greatest use to the greatest number of readers. The symbol "%" before a paragraph number means that only part of the paragraph is indicated.

New Sources

Aitken was unaware of the following sources used by B:

1. Kettlewell, John. The Measures of Christian Obedience (London 1681): Bk. 5, Chs. 4-7, with some omissions, provides the section entitled "Scruples," the last of Vol. 3 and of the LL. 19,000 words.

2. Astell, Mary. A Serious Proposal to the Ladies. 2 pts. (1697): Pt. 2, Ch. 3, Ss. 1-5, to the 3rd last par., is B's source for Pars. 7-96 of "Ignorance" in Vol. 2. Aitken acknowledges material from Vol. 1 of the first edition of the Serious Proposal (1694) but not from Pt. 2, which was published later. 17,000 words.
New Berkeley Passages

For a satisfactory record of B's contribution to the LL, one must supplement the passages provided below with those listed by Aitken and in No. 4 of the Berkeley Newsletter. For a complete record of B's contributions, one must examine the LL against the original texts of those authors such as Fenelon, Taylor, and Fleetwood, whom B at times thoroughly and extensively rewrites and expands, weaving his own arguments through and against theirs in a way that makes the extrication of "insertions" difficult. (Aitken, incidentally, is sensible to list Hickes' translation of Fenelon's Education des Filles as B's source, because phrases from Hickes do appear in the LL. Mostly, however, B - the likely author of the translation of Five Pieces by Fenelon published in 1779 - appears to be doing his own translating, when not freely expanding upon Fenelon's French.) As noteworthy, often, as B's insertions and elaborations are his many omissions, as when in Par. 6 of "Meekness" in Vol. 1 he quietly drops Allestree's phrase (from the Ladies' Calling) the "natural imbecility" of women.

A passage is here asserted to be by B either when it appears as a brief insertion within a single text (often relating thematically to other such insertions) or when it clearly serves an introductory, bridging, or concluding function between texts. Like Aitken, I provide the more pertinent editorial insertions in full and the less pertinent by first and last words only. Other, more perfunctory, introductory, linking, and concluding sentences and paragraphs I follow Aitken and omit altogether.

Sources for the Ladies' Library

Vol. 1

"Employment":

Par. 1. "Can the Imagination of Man form a stronger Image of a Life of Action, than by comparing it to a Race? And how can he hope to finish his Course with Glory, that lags and presses not forward to obtain the Prize?"

Par. 16. "Which [Divine Lectures] in the best Authors are not wrapt up in mystical Phrases, as were the Oracles of old, but deliver'd in plain and easy Language, in our Tongue, either Original or Translations."

Par. 21. "Augustus wore no...great guard to innocence."

Par. 22. "To work...has none."

"Dress":

Par. 7. "How often has the gilt coach been seized by the mercer, and all the fine furniture been the prey of executions? How scandalous is it to see a gentleman's gate crowded with cutlers, while the lord himself sneaks out at the back-door, mocks their impatience, and laughs at their credulity! Modes and fashions are the main causes of this luxury: dress and furniture must be changed according to the whim of the upholsterer, and tailor, or those fantastic men and women who preside over them... The mind is thus constantly taken up with this costly variety; gravity and simplicity of manners are exploded, and levity and folly take place of them."

Par. 13. "It is downright...virtues."

Par. 36. "These reflexions...of the soul."

Par. 49. "The doctrine of obedience is not easily to be taught, to such as have been flattered with the foolish adoration of those, to whom when they marry they vow it... [F]ew there are that regard it as a command, the breach of which is a sin, and the punishment of all sin, death eternal. No wonder those that will not obey their husbands, are so impatient under the least disobedience or
negligence of servants and children, that they are never easy but when they are exerting their superiority."

"Chastity":

Par. %9. "The church of Rome...break it."

14. "How many are now admitted daily to that blessed ordinance [holy communion], who boast of their adultery, and glory in their filthiness?... How is the sacrament of the body of Christ prostituted to mean and mercenary uses? Is the adulterer forbidden to approach it? Is the sacred cup taken from the foul hand of the whoremonger? Are communicants so examined as to intend a through [sic] inquiry into their preparedness to sit at the table of the Lord? Or are not the open whoremonger and adulterer taken on their own credit, because the law has enjoined them to communicate or starve? I must confess I think of this most holy ordinance with so much reverence, that I cannot without trembling consider what herds of adulterous beasts have the glorious privilege of the elect and chosen of God."

%17. "The sure consequences of all wanton dalliance is desire, and if you refrain from the act it will not be out of fear of God, but fear of man, of yourself, or others....You are as much a whoremonger and adulterer taken on their own credit, because the law has enjoined them to communicate or starve? I must confess I think of this most holy ordinance with so much reverence, that I cannot without trembling consider what herds of adulterous beasts have the glorious privilege of the elect and chosen of God."

%18. "Besides to argue with temptation shews a pleasure in being tempted; if you had such an abhorrence for the sin as you ought to have had, you would not dare to have debated it, you would be frightened at the distant approach of it, and fly from it as from destruction."

%19. "When the body...above temptation"; "There is no greater farce...flame of lust"; "yet all this [corporeal mortification] will not avail, unless we conceive a detestation of the evil of it [sin], as an offence to God, and arm our minds against it by his grace. Poverty sins against Chastity as well as Riches, and Colleges are equally polluted with Courts....The extraordinary Mortifications injoin'd by the Church of Rome, and recommended by some Protestants who lay too much Stress on outward Discipline, are not, methinks, worthy the Dignity of Christianity."

SOURCE FOR THE LADIES' LIBRARY

Shall I boast of my Purity when I am reduc'd to Impotence? or confide in that Chastity which is the Effect of Pain?...will be effectual."

21. "When a Woman thinks she is belov'd, she is very far gone in the way of Loving; and apt to believe there cannot be so much harm as is represented to her, in what is so generous and grateful. Poor Delusion! Shou'd Generosity and Gratitude make her damn her own Soul, because her Lover would damn his? But the Devil puts on all Shapes, and appears sometimes like an Angel of Light; he puts fair Glosses on the foulest Actions, confounds Vice and Virtue, and covers a pleasing Temptation with the most specious Pretences."

%23. "and not that whose wanton Mirth...ribaldry and folly."

27. "It is true...hereafter."

"Modesty":

Par. 59. "The Truth is...avoiding them."

"Detraction":

Par. %14. "These Religious Debates...Times."

15. "As there can be no true Religion, without Charity; so there can be no true human Prudence, without Bearing and Condescension. This Rule will direct us, who are of the establish'd Church, in our Carriage towards those that dissent from it, both in our Words and in our Actions. A good Christian wou'd have such mistaken Men ready to throw themselves into the Arms of the Church, and wou'd have those Arms as ready to receive them that shall come to us. He wou'd have no supercilious Look to frighten those stray'd Sheep from coming into the Fold again; nor no hard Words to sharpen their Resentment, and make a perpetual Bar to Unity. But where is there a Disposition in the contending Parties, to bear with one another, to speak well of one another, and put an end to that Fire of Contention, which the Mouts of wicked Men have blown into so terrible a Flame?"

16. "Not only...Religion itself."
40. "Scandal...studied and practised."

"Ignorance":

Par. 1. "It would be an endless Task should we undertake to give Instances of the great Improvements which Women have made of Education, there being hardly any Science in which some of them have not excelled. 'Tis very plain, therefore, that Nature has given them as good Talents as men have, and if they are still called the weaker Sex, 'tis because the other, which assumes the name of the wiser, hinders them from improving their Minds in useful Knowledge, by accustoming them to the Study and Practice of Vanity and Trifles."

Vol. 2

"The Wife";

Par. %40. "Such is the Language...shews her."

%59. "And such a gentle...arbitrary Tyranny."

Vol. 3

"Religion";

Par. 48. "It is to no purpose...infection."

188, 189. "As to other solemnities...word of God."

260. "The delight...with less impatience."

270. "How many sad instances...good Protestants and good Englishmen?"

%272. "These are the lessons...gentleness and moderation."

284. "One would think...but there are certain minds so clogged with earth, that they can relish nothing which has not a little mixture of earthliness. The road to heaven must be more accommodated to their usual walk, or they will not be kept in it; they will return as soon as they have entered it, and be frightened at so strict and difficult a passage...true idea of things."

302. "Tho' the ladies...much mistaken."

"Fasting";

Par. 13. "All Christians... When such solemnities [fasts] are politically appointed, to give a colour to the conduct of designing mens actions, it is a mocking of God Almighty, it is a national sin, and may perhaps draw down a national judgment. The occasion of publick fasts should not only be lawful but apparent, and in some measure necessary...sin of fasting."

20. "Not to build...our past faults."

"Repetance";

Par. 19. "This sure... And how comfortably do some deluded wretches slide into perdition, depending on the efficacy of a few apt prayers by the minister, a too late receiving of the Lord's Supper? Do they think that God will take their service, when the devil can have no more of it; and that the repentance of their last moments, shall atone for the sins of their whole lives? How dreadful will their disappointment be, who die in this sad dream? and in what a world of misery will they awake?"

"Zeal";

Par. %12. "Of faith...exact them."

%17. "We have had of late... False zeal glares with warm words; it is full of froth and foam, but spends itself in professions, and never appears in actions...True zeal will ever be accompanied with charity and humility...the devil"; "Look into...professions"; "Is the zeal...phrases it"; "Virtues...all the reward."
Passages Unidentified

Aitken succeeded in identifying approximately 75% of the Ls. I have managed another 15%, being left with 11 stubborn passages totalling 27,000 words. While one is tempted to argue that some of these are B's, he has only to mistake John Scott's diction and rhythms for B's as often as I have to remember what Pope told Spence: "There is nothing more foolish than to pretend to be sure of knowing a great writer by his style."

Vol. 1

1. "Employment":


2, 3. "Dress":

Pars. %3-5. Moral reflections on dress. 350 words. Pars. 51-67 (including two prayers against vanity). Further reflections on dress. 1,400 words.

4. "Modesty":

Pars. %32-%49, the argument based in Pars. 34-%49 upon a "famous French author." (A passage of physico-theology describing — with much arithmetic, and building (in the original) "on the old Ptolemean system" (Par. 36) — the order, immensity, and wonder of the universe. I do not see it in Fénelon, Descartes, Pascal, Fontenelle, Malebranche or Bossuet.) 3,600 words.

5. "Envy":

Pars. 2-5. Against envy. 1,100 words.

Vol. 2

6, 7. "The Mother":

Vol. 3

8. "Religion":

Pars. 190-206. The pleasure of piety. 3,500 words.

9., 10. "The Sacrament":

Pars. %19-25, by Tillotson? Significance of the sacrament, including three prayers. Only a semicolon divides the passage from the Tillotson piece in the Devout Christian's Companion, but I have been unable to find its original. 1,400 words.

Pars. 32-47. History and importance of the sacrament. 4,000 words.

11. "Perfection":

Pars. 1-15 (i.e., the entire section). On the means to human perfection, concluding with a prayer. 3,300 words.

Sources for the Ladies' Library

Pars. %29-39. Weaknesses of daughters. 2,000 words. Pars. %63-72. On the importance of mothering and of education by the mother, with a recommendation of Locke's "excellent treatise of education" (Par. 67). 3,000 words.

Vol. 3

8. "Religion":

Pars. 190-206. The pleasure of piety. 3,500 words.

9., 10. "The Sacrament":

Pars. %19-25, by Tillotson? Significance of the sacrament, including three prayers. Only a semicolon divides the passage from the Tillotson piece in the Devout Christian's Companion, but I have been unable to find its original. 1,400 words.

Pars. 32-47. History and importance of the sacrament. 4,000 words.

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Sources


BERKELEY'S INTRODUCTION DRAFT

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Jessop's edition of the 'Draft' Introduction to Berkeley's Principles (Trinity College Ms. 453) was a marked improvement over Fraser's muddled efforts at differentiating earlier and later strata. But Jessop limited himself to the first state of the manuscript, while also rationalizing some minor authorial errors. We now have a fully stratified presentation of this fascinating ms. by Bertil Belfrage which is as much an advance upon Jessop as Jessop was upon Fraser. It was not available — and I had not studied the ms. — at the time I reviewed the French translation by Dominique Berlioz-Bertellier in Berkeley Newsletter no. 10. Mme Berlioz saw Belfrage's edition in draft. Although this cannot have been the basis for her own assessment of the relative worth of Fraser and Jessop, it does account for some features of her edition which had seemed anomalous.

I say advisedly that she saw Belfrage's edition 'in draft', since both of them follow E. J. Furlong in repudiating that term as a description of what we have in Berkeley's hand. Any pre-publication state of a work is a draft, whether it be the first ruminations, a set of layered changes, the definitive draft for the printer, or a printer's proof at a stage where this is still subject to authorial recasting. What has come down to us was Berkeley's working copy, albeit written in a fair hand suitable for private circulation — for not even in the 18th century did one instruct a printer to print italics by simulating italic print as is done here. Paper was always used economically, and there is no difference between a first draft and a fair copy until such time as the ms. becomes unfit to pass to a compositor.

Two related pieces of evidence show this was all along the author's working copy. First, the marginal dates, somewhere between a paragraph and a page apart, mark the weekdays from Nov. 15 to Dec. 18, 1708. These too often match changes of ink or pen to be anything but the dates of the original writing, and they give a unique glimpse into Berkeley's painstaking habits of piecemeal composition. The writing changes are most visible after Nov. 20, 23, 24, 30, Dec. 3, 4, 9, 13; but a few others look fairly certain under a magnifying glass. Several dates correspond to a position which was the end of the sentence as first written, but is now in mid-sentence as a result of Berkeley's extending his writing next day: see Nov. 22, 25, and probably also 19. Still others are at positions which, as a result of subsequent writing, are now in mid-paragraph. Belfrage's apriorisms about modern book preparation (pp. 20-22) are of no weight against these visible facts.

Secondly, there are places where Berkeley was clearly constructing his phrasing in the course of writing, where his deletions and recastings — even some early verso entries — must already have been entered before he completed the original sentence or paragraph that now contains them. At fol. 11r lines 16-17, for instance, Berkeley was struggling for the right nuance, and had three attempts before successfully bringing to a conclusion a sentence intended to capture as exactly as possible a thesis which was meant to be common ground between himself and his source, in order to generate out of it a consciously anti-Lockean position. At fols. 17v-18r another attempt to formulate — as it happens — a Lockean thesis spills over to the verso, before the whole sentence is abandoned and restarted. These however are not different strata of composition: they are a living record of Berkeley's struggle to get something down first time. But to read them as such a record one has to be familiar with the sources he was wrestling with.

A more elaborate example is seen straddling fols. 10-11. By the time he reached around fol. 11r line 3, Berkeley was getting his tenses mixed. He recast consistently in the present tense ('was' twice corrected to 'is'). But having opened a new sentence 'For if there were' (sc. any precise bounds or limits to a particular abstract idea), he now decided to shift from the particular to the general. The newly amended 'this Sort is' (formerly 'was') was revised again, to the more general 'these Sorts are', and four other phrases are converted from singular to plural. Where the changes could not easily be made by superimposition, he resorted to the facing page. But when he came to 'if there were', this was not necessary because he had not written any further. He deleted 'there were,' and continued on the same line: 'For if they had I do not see, How there could be those [those repeated] Doubts & Scruples, about the...
Sorting of particular Beings, which that Author insists on as a good Proof. After this, it no longer makes sense to go back to the earlier past tense forms and convert them to singular past tenses: the change from past to present had to precede that from singular to plural, which in turn had to occur before the sentence just quoted was finished. And here is one more direct allusion to Locke ('that Author') — which was again immediately modified.

Diligent readers can try out other cases. This is not just for the curiosity value of spotting the point at which a given modification happened to occur. By relating Berkeley's wording closely to his known sources one can see his own position evolving out of his particular perception of someone else's. Although he was phrasing as he went along, he might of course have been revising from an earlier draft. But there is an argument against this too, in his self-correction at fol. 12r line 6, quoting Locke, Essay IV. vil. 9. He began to write 'that general' instead of 'that carry'. This appears to be a slip of the eye, transcribing from an open copy of the fifth edition in front of him, where the two phrases occur one below the other on successive lines.

If Belfrage's description of the ms. is erroneous, there is little to fault in the actual transcription, where the standard of accuracy is exceptionally high in everything but Greek.² New readers should first study the transcription of fol. 24v-25r beside the photographic reproduction on pp. 60-61. (This however conflicts with the editor's commentary: it will be seen that the texts quoted on p. 49 as if they represent 'a later stratum' all figured in the original writing, and were gradually deleted.) The explanation of the editor's typographical practices is generally precise, but there are some mistaken references to omissions (pp. 12, 49) where he means deletions. And a quick glance at Belfrage's edition — or the ms. — solves my biggest perplexity about Mme Berlioz's translation. For although she incorporated translations of deleted phrasing, with an appropriate notation, she failed to identify added phrasing, except where it occurs on the verso pages; so what I formerly impugned as apparent paraphrase is in most cases — just as in Fraser — a mixing of temporal strata. If an editor is recording changes, then deletions and additions are necessarily of equal status. Without both, one cannot detect — and so one cannot detect in the French edition, as one can in

Belfrage's actual shifts from one phrasing to another, which is the only point of the exercise.³

All variants within the ms. are incorporated in Belfrage's transcription, which reproduces deletions and additions through a literal representation in print of the organization of the written page. This has been set out with great ingenuity and precision. But I believe many scholars would have benefited from a more traditional foot-of-the-page record of the ms. changes, saving the facing pages (here reserved for Berkeley's own facing-page addenda) for a parallel transcription of the later published text. The reader interested in a collation with the printed versions of the Introduction must turn to a Spartan appendix. In printing Berkeley's early casting of the Introduction in isolation, Belfrage perpetuates the tradition established by Fraser and Jessop, and followed in the French edition, of presenting it as an autonomous exercise. The new title, Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction, is not 'neutral' (p. 11) if it suggests to less wary readers that there is another, second, Introduction somewhere — namely the one that was published. It is not like the alternative overtures to Fidelio. There are only alternative states of one Introduction to the Principles. If Jessop saw no real development in Berkeley's thought from the first state to the finished product, Belfrage's imperfect grasp of Berkeley's language and a perverse sense of exegetical method lead him to see too much. Minute attention to the written characters is clearly essential to determine Berkeley's words; but the same attention to the words alone, in a historical and contextual vacuum, will never establish his meaning.

Belfrage compromises his intended distinction between a strictly factual introduction and an interpretative commentary by a nonsensical piece of exegesis which appears in his introduction alongside the unduly coloured interpretation of the marginal dates. By taking phrases out of context, he makes out that Berkeley in the ms. denies the possibility of abstract ideas or general signs and in the printed text he asserts it. The trouble begins over fol. 3 lines 22ff., where Berkeley is credited with a definition (of 'abstract ideas' as 'Ideas which equally represent the Particulars of any Sort') which no-one in that period would have seriously mistaken for a definition. Belfrage sets this beside another fragmentary phrase from sec. 12 of the Introduction as published (about general ideas 'being made to represent or
stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort), and contends that a rejection of the first doctrine is inconsistent with acceptance of the second. Even at a formal level this is not right, since the first quotation was about ideas representing particulars whereas the second is about ideas representing ideas. But restore the context and there is no problem. In both passages Berkeley was rejecting a composite package — that there are ideas which represent, and are arrived at by a specified form of abstraction or mental separation, and have a certain content. If the whole conjunction is incoherent, as he undoubtedly believed, that does not entail that every conjunct is to be dismissed.

In the editorial commentary proper, Belfrage finds in the ms. a sharp distinction between two modes of representation, 'the different manners wherein Words represent Ideas, & Ideas things'. The most interesting part of his discussion — I found it the most suggestive part of the whole commentary — traces the second mode through a theory of representation by copying, imaging or resembling, a theory that has also been recognized here in the recent work of Kenneth Winkler. Belfrage shows very well how this conception of representation is central to the argument against representative ideas in the ms. But he has no interest in where this conception of representation comes from (which would bring us again to Berkeley's perception and handling of Locke and thereby the whole purpose and effect of his argument) nor looks very far to find its obvious survival into Berkeley's mature work (notably its exploitation in Principles 8, 27, 33, and the second letter to Le Clerc).

Instead, he finds momentous philosophical differences in relatively minor shifts in the continuum from ms. to published text. So he claims to see in the mature Principles a thesis anticipated in the Theory of Vision but missing from the ms., that ideas represent things 'after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for' (p. 30). On p. 31 he goes so far as to say that this thesis, which is not so much as considered in the ms., is a target there — apparently confusing semantic representation with abstraction. What Berkeley asserted at the points cited from the main text is that visual ideas suggest tangible objects in the manner stated. Certainly this is not in the ms., but neither does it show up in the published Introduction, so no chronological lessons can be drawn. Belfrage refers to Intro. secs. 12, 15 and 19, but the issue is different. There Berkeley describes how one particular line may represent or signify other particular lines. But he was not trying to suggest thereby that words represent by signifying other particular words, or that a visual line signifies a tangible line in the way that it may represent other visual lines. Berkeley used semantic models in more than one way on different occasions. One apparent by-product of conflating these is that Belfrage at pp. 35-6 has Berkeley asserting what Berkeley plainly denies, that the same visual line may have different visual appearances.

On the first mode of representation, that of words, Belfrage rightly stresses that in the ms. words are to be associated only with individuals, but I think he misreads the texts if he supposes Berkeley ever changed his views. In the published version Berkeley still holds that — to the extent that words represent at all — they represent only individuals. He introduces the example of a representative line (sec. 12; cf. main text sec. 126-8, and Alciphron VII. 7, first edn.) but not as an example of what the word 'line' signifies. It is an example of how the arbitrary but familiar representation of lines by lines that goes on in geometry — the one discipline into which he explicitly admits general or representative ideas — can provide an intelligible model for the hitherto unanalysed representation of individuals by general words.4

Berkeley characterized this relationship even in the ms. as one of representing, signifying, or standing for. To know what he was about one must be immersed in the 18th-century traditions that this edition so studiously eschews. 'Berkeley's own view', says Belfrage, 'is that one general name correlates with several particular ideas, sometimes referring to one, sometimes to another idea' (p. 43). But refer is not a concept in Berkeley's vocabulary (his occasional use of 'denote' does not have technical associations), and correlates with is a relationship more opaque than any of Berkeley's own. The recurrence throughout the commentary of anachronistic terms from modern philosophical logic has the effect of drawing Berkeley too far away from the targets that he himself knew. The effect is momentarily dazzling, but, like any other pyrotechnic display, it leaves one at the end in darkness.

One example of this anachronism is in Belfrage's discussion of names and descriptions. It is supposed to be relevant to
Berkeley's purpose that 'This table over here' is, and 'The table I write on here and now' is not, a 'genuine proper name' (pp. 39-40). Since there is no theoretical difference between them, it is fortunate that Berkeley's own use of 'name' does not embrace either of them. There are things Berkeley recognized as individual names, like 'Melampus' as it occurs in the sentence 'Melampus is an animal'. Berkeley says of the terms as they are used in this example that 'Melampus' denotes or stands for one particular idea and that 'animal', though significant, 'stands for or represents' no idea at all. Belfrage does on p. 43 seem to concede that Berkeley has said that 'animal' here stands for no idea, but makes out that Berkeley did not know his own mind. He intended to convey that the name 'animal' stands for no true or complete idea, but 'refers to' and 'correlates with' the same idea as 'Melampus', being defined by an incomplete or undetermined description which adds up to something less than the whole of Melampus. Is this improvisation, or desperation? There is nothing indeterminate in the content Berkeley himself ascribes to the sentence (fol. 21r). It is the simple lexical information that the individual Melampus 'has a right to be called by the Name Animal'.

A second example concerns the doctrine which Belfrage variously calls Berkeley's 'emotive theory of meaning' or 'theory of emotive meaning'. I share his view that the fuller exploration of this doctrine is one of the delights of the ms., though I doubt that it is 'the first theory of emotive meaning in the history of ideas' (p. 45), for it has echoes of Cicero and Hobbes. But an unfortunate consequence of the anachronistic labelling is that, besides misleading the commentator into adopting 20th-century analogues, it suggests a historical doctrine which Berkeley never contemplates, that there are uses of language which, without explicitly asserting that anything is the case, express or evince the feelings of the speaker. If one is looking for a modern idiom in terms of which to capture something of what he was talking about, Austin's terminology of 'perlocutionary effects' offers better possibilities. Berkeley mentions three: (a) the raising – as distinct from the evincing – of a passion, (b) the 'exciting to or deterring from an Action' (both of these in the first stratum on fol. 25r), and (c) 'the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition' (both of these in the first stratum on fol. 25r). Belfrage's commentary is not helpful on these distinctions.

Berkeley's examples of the first at work include the words 'Lie' and 'Rascal'. These words, he says, conjure in the mind the emotions of indignation, revenge 'and the sudden motions of Anger' (fol. 26r). Belfrage runs together (p. 48) the names of the emotions ('Indignation', 'Revenge') with the words that elicit them ('Lie', 'Rascal').

Berkeley's examples of the second include an account of what it is to say of an action that it is honourable and virtuous (fol. 25r); 'that Such an Action is Honourable' is an oratio obliqua form in which 'Such an Action' is a variable to be replaced in any particular oratio recta. Belfrage misconstrues this syntax, and also Berkeley's account of the action that the hearer is stirred to perform. It is only the action commended as honourable, not the action — since there isn't one — of esteeming (p. 49). (And let us not get too carried away about Berkeley's perspicacity here. If one says of someone that he has done the honourable thing and married the girl, it is hardly plausible to interpret this, as Berkeley's theory appears to do, as some sort of encouragement to bigamy.) But having seen almost at once that the name expression may also 'excite in the Mind of the Hearer an esteem of that particular Action', Berkeley went back to add the third function in the same early hand, 'the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition', under which can then be subsumed his account of deference to Aristotle.

What it is to hold out to someone the promise of 'Good Things' in heaven eventually falls firmly into the third group (fol. 24v), but if Berkeley has a consistent view of it when it first crops up, in a passage subsequently cut (fols. 22-4), it must be the raising of passions (emotions), e.g. of cheerfulness and zeal. In so far as Berkeley thinks, on occasion, that the expression 'Good Things' is used to induce 'a willingness to perform that which is requir'd of him', it must be wrong to equate this with 'our teaching a dog to respond to the term "Jump!"' (Belfrage, p. 47). Teaching a dog to jump is not exciting a willingness to jump, or indeed anything broadly 'emotive'.

In setting up a sharp distinction between the aims expressed in the ms. and those of the Introduction in its published form, Belfrage overlooks that the ms. makes more references forward to the future text than the published version. It leads him, I believe, to misunderstand the sense in which in either version Berkeley
'anticipates his design' (p. 28). 'Anticipate' in older English does not mean 'look forward to'. Once again one has to look at the argument in context. The demolition of the theory of abstract ideas precedes and is independent of the discussion of the signification of words. The latter discussion is introduced in response to Berkeley's looking for an explanation of the belief he thinks he has refuted. Why would anyone believe in abstract ideas? Because they are confused about words. As Berkeley says, he had wanted to say something about the use of words (i.e. about their not just standing for ideas) by way of preface to what he had to say about our human faculties; but then he found himself 'anticipating his design', that is, having to nail a particular thesis about our faculties first in order to sell his message about words to a generation which has been corrupted in its philosophy.

Dr Belfrage's commentary organizes into a unified interpretation the scattered and fragmentary notes which he has published over the years and gives them a cohesion, if not cogency, previously lacking. He challenges the reader's intuitions in a provocative and exhilarating way. But there is a spurious formalism to the presentation which should not be mistaken for substance. No chain can withstand the weakness of its links. Where the documentation breaks down, which is not infrequently, the editor repairs the breach by recycling the same material a further time, and interspersing it with a great deal of blank space. The transcribed text, on the other hand, sets new praise, and I hope it will attract a new generation of scholars to an under-used resource.

NOTES


2. Fol. 3r line 17: interlinear needs to should read needs; and in line 18 contradictions with added comma has replaced an earlier contradictory Opinions. Fol. 6r line 15: & is superimposed on deleted or. Fol. 13r lines 11-12: only Fraser read Berkeley's Greek minuscules correctly; Jessop and Berlioz twice misread esti, while Belfrage misreads not only esti but schedon, gnorizein and malista. Fol. 17r line 25: marginal 2 is superimposed on 1 consistently with the other amended dates. Fol. 19r line 13: from Besides to that is undeleted in the ms.; to any one is then deleted a second time. Fol. 22r: there should be a break in the marginal line at line 13, indicating temporally distinct deletions. The editor sometimes conflates first and second states in cases where individual characters, including punctuation, must for reasons of sense be integral to a particular revision (e.g., fol. 2r line 29, 3r line 29); and in a few places there is room for disagreement over capitals and changes of ink.

3. In private correspondence Mme Berlioz has disputed my strictures on her translations of specific phrases. Since I am not professionally bilingual, I must defer, in matters of strict translation, to anyone who is, and did so in preparing my review. But my main criticisms involved interpretational issues. Whether Berkeley thought St Paul a prophete is not settled by a dictionary, but by a consideration of protestant theology; and whether in some possible world remplaceur might have the force of representat is immaterial to the primary point that two different translators regularly rendered not just the same words but the same sentences so differently that the French reader must find seemingly significant changes in Berkeley's thought where there was no change.

4. I discussed this at length in a paper on 'Abstraction and Representation' at a conference on Hume and Hume's Connexions organized by the British Society for the History of Philosophy in association with the Hume Society in August 1989. This will be published in due course.

5. I am sure Belfrage is right (p. 20) that Berkeley's shaky recollection of the words of the Apostle at fols. 22-24 is a synthesis of 1 Cor. 29 and the Collect for the sixth Sunday after Trinity. He concludes that Berkeley must have been searching for a non-existent apostolic Greek for 'Good Things'. I would hazard that the word Berkeley was after was endoxa. This occurs in the Septuagint at Isa. 64: 3-4, the precursor of the passage in Paul. Berkeley's use of the Pauline text is possibly one more reflection of his reading in Locke (IV. xviii. 3).

BERKELEY'S INTRODUCTION DRAFT
THE NOTES ON THE GOVERNMENT AND POPULATION OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES AND BERKELEY'S PROBABLE ROUTE TO SICILY

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There is evidence that George Berkeley was in Sicily. The route that he took to get there was not elaborated upon by him in his known journals. However, in his third journal he records population data about selected cities and towns in the Kingdom of Naples. A review and plotting of the city and town data provide important clues about his probable route to the island of Sicily.

In the last part of Berkeley's third journal (MS. 39309), he includes information about the population and government of the Kingdom of Naples but does not give this part of the journal a heading. However, Luce and Jessop give this segment of Berkeley's journal the title of NOTES ON THE GOVERNMENT AND POPULATION OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. The first part of this section (pp. 306-307) which shall be referred to in this paper as the Notes... is a compilation of population data by Berkeley in the Kingdom of Naples. Berkeley did not record population data from the three provinces of Abruzzo Ultra', Abruzzo Citra' and Molise. Jessop and Famiani do not include the Notes... in their book and the reason given is that the material is a substantial recomposition of paragraphs extracted by Berkeley from different authors.

Some facts are known about Berkeley and Sicily. He wrote a letter to Tomasso Campailla on February 25, 1718 from Messina (Sicily). In a July 28, 1718 letter to Sir John Percival, Berkeley refers to observing the antiquities in Sicily. In Gentleman's Magazine, (April 1750), Berkeley refers to being in Messina and Catania, Sicily in the year 1718. Berkeley's thoughts on petrifications are contained in a letter to Thomas Prior dated May 20, 1746 in which Berkeley mentions being in Catania and also Agrigentum, a coastal town on the southern side of the island of Sicily.

In the Account of the Life of George Berkeley, Joseph Stock claims "knowledge of every fact he related..." because of "Particular acquaintance with the family and friends of Bishop Berkeley...". Stock also reports on Berkeley's "second excursion" to Italy and that he:

In particular travelled over Apulia, Tarantese (from which he wrote an accurate and entertaining account of the Tarantula to Dr. Friend) Calabria, and the whole island of Sicily. The last country engaged his attention so strongly, that he had with great industry compiled very considerable materials for a natural history of the island: but by an unfortunate accident these together with a journal of his transactions were lost in the passage to Naples...

About Berkeley, Stock writes, "... that his friends remember to have heard from him, that in the town by Virgil called palmosa Selinus, AEneid III - 705, he found the ruins of a most significant temple." Selinus was an Ancient Greek city located on the extreme southwest coast of Sicily. The modern Italian city of Selinunte is built on its ruins. If Stock recorded accurate recollections by Berkeley's friends, then Berkeley would have travelled the breadth of Sicily.

T.E. Jessop and Mariapaola Famiani in George Berkeley: Viaggio in Italia write that Berkeley returned to Naples from Ischia about the middle of October, 1717 and that shortly thereafter, perhaps at the end of October, departed for Sicily, where it seems he may have remained for four months. They speculate that perhaps at the end of February, 1718 he was again in Naples. Reference by Jessop and Famiani is also made to Joseph Warton, English poet and author, writing that Berkeley travelled around Sicily on foot (Essay on the genius and writings of Pope, London, 1782). They express doubt that Berkeley would have been able to make a trip around the island on foot, given the dates of Berkeley's letters, i.e., a letter to Alexander Pope from Naples on October 22, 1717 followed by a letter dated February 25, 1718 to
Campiglia from Messina informing him of already having toured the island. This was followed by a letter to Percival from Rome on July 28, 1718 referring to the art and architecture in Sicily. However, the time involved and being on foot may take on a different meaning in traveling the island when one reads Italy in its Original Glory, Ruine, & Revival, by an English traveller Edmund Warcup. He notes:

From the said City Messina to Palermo there are not fixed posts from place to place as above named, but provide and hire Mules from Messina, there to be found for that service, accustomed to pass over those Mountains both speedily and securely; this journey is 180 Miles; wherefore (with the greatest diligence) it cannot be attained in less than two days and a half; which voyage when any Messenger or other person is obliged to expedite, they pay for the said Mules as for the twenty Posts.¹¹

Berkeley obtained the population data from the work of Abate Giovanni Battista Pacichelli, Il Regno di Napoli, a copy of which was included in his own personal library. In preparation of this article, a twentieth century reproduction of Pacichelli’s work was used which is published in three volumes (one volume for each of the three-part work) and totals approximately 800 pages.

Berkeley listed only a very few of the cities and towns and their respective fuochi (the number of nuclear families) from each of Pacichelli’s province listings. At first glance reading of the data in the Notes... appears to be merely a compilation for which Berkeley might have found some future use or merely a reflection of a personal interest unknown to the reader. However, when the locations of the cities and towns are plotted on a map, the data takes on a new significance. Their locations are generally along a main travel route south from Naples to Messina.

In the compilation of Berkeley’s second and third journals, Jessop and Famiani¹² developed a listing of places where Berkeley lodged, passed through, or viewed at a distance. This list was cross-referenced by the writer of this article with the nine provincial cities and towns in the Notes... beginning with Terra di Lavoro and ending with Capitanata. All of the cities and towns listed in five of the provinces were experienced by Berkeley, i.e., Terra di Lavoro, Principato Ultra, Terra d’Otranto, Terra di Bari and Capitanata.

There is no confirming journal evidence that he experienced the cities and towns of the other four provinces, i.e., Principato Citra Salerno, Basilicata, Calabria Bassa o’ Citra, and Calabria Alto o’ Ultra. Accompanying journal notes or other documentary materials on these four provinces may have been among the materials Stock mentions were lost in passage. However, these four provinces would have been the ones a land traveller would have passed through en route to the island of Sicily from Naples. It seems inconsistent that Berkeley would include in this section cities and towns of four provinces he did not experience with cities and towns of five provinces he did experience.

The composite map, captioned Berkeley’s Probable Route to Sicily, was generated from a review of the maps of Magini (1620), Pacichelli (1703), Swinburne (1777), maps printed for Andrew Drury (1777), and Saint Non (1781). It illustrates the locations of the cities and towns mentioned in the four provinces as well as what would have been a main travel route south from Naples to Messina. Both Swinburne and Saint Non travelled essentially the same probable route Berkeley took to Sicily. The Drury map from Naples to Sicily also shows essentially the same route.

The composite map also shows four locations which Berkeley visited in Sicily, i.e., Selinus, Agrigentum, Catania, and Messina. Given the sparse number of locations and the main road patterns taken from the Saint Non map and shown on the composite, it is very difficult to speculate about his route progression on the island.

The Saint Non¹³ map shows the Via Appia near Naples and from it another Roman road called the Via Popilia proceeds southward toward Messina. This main route then continues along the Ionian Sea coast toward Taranto (Province of Terra d’Otranto) and beyond. The bulk of the cities and towns listed by Berkeley generally fall along the main travel route from Naples toward Messina.

The pattern of cities and towns along the Ionian coast from Catanzaro to Cassano suggests a looping pattern Berkeley may have followed en route to and from Sicily. This route was along the southern coast of the Italian boot. The probable land route from
Naples to Sicily and return, taken in conjunction with part of his earlier Apulia route, indicates that Berkeley would have toured practically the whole southern Italian coastline from the Adriatic city of Barletta, south to the heel and toe of the Italian boot, and then northward to Naples.

Both the Swinburne and Saint Non maps show a passage route to Naples by sea from Palermo, Sicily. However, according to Jessop and Famiani, Berkeley writes Campailla from Messina that he has already toured the island. Given the speculation that Berkeley experienced all the cities and towns he listed in the Notes..., he then would have had to cross from Messina to the mainland, experience those cities on the sole, and then proceed across land from Cassano to some point on the northern coast for passage to Naples.

Further, Berkeley was interested in recording his travels and the antiquities that he saw. A sea voyage from Sicily to Naples would have bypassed the experience of traveling the sole of the boot and reporting a rather complete tour of southern Italy and Sicily.

It is known that Berkeley was in Sicily in 1718. He did not provide any narrative evidence in his existing journals about his route to Sicily and what he might have seen. However, the Notes... provide a listing of cities and towns which fall along a traveled main route from Naples to Sicily. All of the cities and towns in the Notes... located in the Apulia region can be found in Berkeley's narrative of his tour there. Therefore, it seems quite consistent that the remainder of the cities and towns were experienced by Berkeley as well. These give form to Berkeley's probable route from Naples to Sicily and are recorded on the composite map.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Charles Allsworth of the Graphic Arts Department of Rhode Island College for his technical assistance in the preparation of the composite map and to Lisa Lawrence for the actual drawing of it.
NOTES


4. Ibid., p. 111.


6. Ibid., IV, 251-252.


8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 55.


REFERENCES


Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley


The emphasis in this useful volume is on the correct interpretation of various aspects of Berkeley's thought rather than on, for instance, defending Berkeley or showing his relevance for contemporary philosophy. The quality of the scholarship is, for the most part, high. Many of the essays make a clear and convincing case. Each of them will be of interest to anyone who is thinking about its topic. I devote most of this review to giving an outline of the content of each essay, but I make the odd critical comment as I proceed.

Margaret Wilson, writing in response to recent essays by Montgomery Furth, Robert Adams, and J.J. Macintosh in which similarities between Berkeley and Leibniz have been emphasized, explores some of the differences between these two philosophers. There is nominal agreement between them that phenomena exist only in substances that perceive them, but their accounts of perception, for one thing, differ so radically that this agreement is merely nominal. They also differ in that Berkeley rejects, while Leibniz accepts in a modified form, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Daniel Garber denies that Berkeley's system is a "half-way house between Locke and Hume". In particular, Berkeley's rejection of Locke's account of substance in general is more thoroughgoing than the "half-way house" story recognizes. There is a superficial resemblance between Berkeley's claims about the emptiness of various conceptions of matter and Locke's remarks about the obscurity of our idea of substance, but Berkeley's aim is to repudiate what Locke regards as obscure but defensible.

Margaret Atherton and Martha Brandt Bolton both examine the central role of Berkeley's case against abstraction in his defense of his system. Atherton says that in discussions of abstract ideas there has been too much emphasis on the case against abstract general ideas, such as the abstract idea of a triangle, and as a result the point of the long attack on abstract ideas in the introduction to the Principles has been obscured. She correctly insists on emphasizing the impossibility of conceiving separately what is not experienced separately. Bolton focuses on the way in which Berkeley's general views about ideas underpin his case against abstraction. Central to her reading is the observation that, for Berkeley, our ideas are identical with the objects of which our ideas are ideas. One result of this fact is that if it is impossible for what an abstract idea (or any idea) is an idea of to exist, then it is impossible for that idea to exist.

Ian Tipton examines a number of interpretations (including those of Désirée Park and Michael Ayers) of the "Master Argument", the argument that no unperceived physical objects exist since we are unable to conceive of such an object. He makes some interesting suggestions about how Berkeley's uncertainty about the relation between the objects we perceive and our ideas of those objects contributes to our difficulty in understanding the Master Argument. His own reading of the Master Argument emphasizes drawing "the curtain of words" and focussing solely on our thoughts:

Look at a tree. Then close your eyes and try supposing that it is unperceived. That involves attending to what is in your mind: the image. Given that you are now allowed to entertain thoughts about that object, there is one thought that you cannot coherently entertain, this being the thought that it is not mind-dependent. It is, after all, your image. (94, underlinings mine)

Tipton acknowledges that this argument is flawed, although he treats it, if anything, too kindly. How flawed it is may be seen by noting that the referents of the two underlined occurrences of "it" are crucially different.

Geneviève Brykman correctly observes that Berkeley's acknowledgement of immaterial archetypes is sometimes reluctant, and often occurs in the course of his responses to objections. But her claims that archetypes "play no role in immaterialism" (103) and that he did not really mean to accept
that there are archetypes are unconvincing and inadequately supported.

M.R. Ayers argues that the Passivity Argument — roughly, the argument that our ideas of sense are passively received by us and must come from a wise and powerful spirit — has a more central role in Berkeley's thinking than the Continuity Argument — roughly, the argument that God must exist if the continued existence of objects while they are not perceived by us is to be accounted for. Ayers points out that there is a third argument, which he calls the Distinctness Argument, which Berkeley's commentators have failed to distinguish from the other two, and which is being presented in many passages which have been otherwise interpreted. According to the Distinctness Argument sensible things exist distinct from being perceived by us, therefore they must be perceived by some other mind, hence there must be a mind which perceives them.

David Kline carefully examines different interpretations, in particular those proposed by Michael Hooker, of the argument for God's existence in Dialogue IV of Alciphron. His preferred interpretation is that it is an inference to the best explanation rather than a version of the Design Argument, the Passivity Argument, or the Continuity Argument. Nature constitutes a language, and the best explanation of that fact is that God speaks to us through nature. The argument derives from Descartes' argument for other minds.

Robert Adams examines the meaning of Berkeley's question in Principles 18: "But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, yet how is it possible for us to know this?" (By this point in the Principles, Berkeley thinks he has established that it is not possible that solid (etc.) substances should exist without the mind.) Berkeley's view is that we could not know there to be an external world through our senses alone since our senses only tell us about (that is, tell us about without any inferences) our sensations. He also opposes Evidential Realism, the view that our knowledge of the external world is inferentially based on the evidence of our senses. Evidential Realism is not necessary for accounting for our sensations; nor does it help to account for our sensations, for they can be explained better by appeal to God. Since Berkeley and his opponents all believed in God, and God would surely be powerful enough to give us our sensations in the absence of external bodies, external bodies are unnecessary. Furthermore, they raise difficulties of their own, such as the difficulty of interaction. This response to Evidential Realism is especially convincing, says Adams, if we read Berkeley as allowing that there is a structure exhibited among God's ideas which corresponds to the putative material structure of Berkeley's opponents. Adams also argues that Direct Realism is no better off than Evidential Realism because the Direct Realist will have to give an account of the role of our sensations in justifying our beliefs about bodies, an account which will be akin to that of the Evidential Realist, and which will be subject to similar objections. Adams' central contention is that Berkeley's immaterialism compares favourably with these and other forms of Realism.

Phillip D. Cummins provides a close and detailed reading of sections 41 to 51 of the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (NTV). His main preoccupation is with the status of "visuals", by which he means what is immediately seen. In earlier sections of NTV Berkeley has tried to show that an object's distance from a perceiver is never immediately seen. But the question of whether or not we immediately see objects which are at a distance, as distinct from ideas which are in our minds, remains to be settled. Cummins gives a detailed analysis of the complex case which Berkeley provides in support of the claim that no visual is spatially external to one who sees it.

In a persuasive essay George Pappas examines a number of accounts of what Berkeley means by "immediate perception". His own account is as follows. To immediately perceive something (O) is either to see it or to touch it or smell it (etc.). Immediate perception in each of these sensory modes can be defined along the following lines. To say, for instance, that S immediately sees O is to say that -- here I simplify a little --

(1) S sees O; and (2) it is false that S would see O only if S were to perceive R, where R is not identical to O, and where R is not a part or element...of O, nor is O of R...and (3) it is false that S would see O only if O were to be suggested to S by R.

Pappas plausibly suggests that physical objects, and not just individual ideas, are immediately perceived: we immediately
perceive physical objects by immediately perceiving some of the ideas which constitute them.

Bertil Belfrage argues convincingly against the standard interpretation of the marginal sign "+" in the Philosophical Commentaries, according to which it means, roughly, "delete". He questions Luce's claims about the existence of one or more lost manuscripts on which the Philosophical Commentaries were believed by Luce to be based. He also discusses some of the changes that Berkeley's system underwent in the course of his writing of the notebooks.

Finally, Wolfgang Breidert points out how little attention Berkeley has received in Germany. He comments on the treatment of Berkeley by some less well known German philosophers.

I have barely scratched the surface. But I have said enough, I hope, to make it clear that this volume is an important contribution to Berkeley scholarship.

Robert McKim
The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

The Colin and Alisa Turbayne Berkeley Essay Prize

The Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, is pleased to announce the establishment of an annual international competition for the best new and unpublished essay in English on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. The essay should be no more than 5,000 words in length. The deadline for the competition will be November 1st of each year. Submissions will be judged by members of a review board selected by the Department of Philosophy at Rochester. The winner whose name will be announced March 1st of the following year will receive a prize of $1,000.00. Submissions should be sent to:

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